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ABSTRACT
Theprovision of social security benefits to retirees distorts the saving
decisions of workers who are rational enough to save for their future. Since the
implicit rate of return in an unfunded social security program is less than the
marginal product of capital, the resulting decline in saving causes a welfare
loss. It has been suggested that this welfare loss could be reduced, while still
protecting those who lack the foresight to save for their retirement (the
"myopes" and "partial myopes" of the paper), by replacing the current universal
social security program with a means-tested program that pays benefits only to
the "myopic" individuals who have little or no other retirement income or
assets.
The present paper evaluates this suggestion with the help of an explicit
steady-state welfare comparison of the optimal universal and optimal
means-tested programs. The relative welfare levels depend on characteristics of
the economy (the growth rates of population and real wages and the productivity
of capital) and of the population (the frequency and degree of myopia with
respect to saving for retirement).
The analysis shows that, although a means tested program is generally
superior, it does not always dominate the best alternative universal program.
A universal program can be preferable under conditions which imply that the
optimal means-tested program would induce rational savers to stop saving. The
analysis also implies that overall welfare can be increased by using different
social security programs for different groups of workers if the working
population as a whole can be divided into two or more subgroups with different
mixes of myopes, partial myopes and rational life-cycle savers.
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Harvard University
Caxrbridge, MA 02138
NationalBureau of Economic
Pesearch
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Caxtbridge, MA 02138SHOULD SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS BE MEANS-TESTED?
Martin Feldsteinl
Every society must solve the problem of supporting those individuals who
become too old to work but have not made adequate provision for theirown old
age by saving when they were young. At the present time, the major
industrial countries of the world have responded to this problemby creating
social security programs that tax the working population and use theproceeds
to provide a "universal" benefit to all retirees regardless of their
financial condition.
This universal provision of social security benefits distorts the saving
decisions of those workers who are rational enough to plan for the future.2
Since the implicit rate of return that taxpayers get on their contributions
to an unfunded social security program is less than the return available on
1Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President, the National
Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Gilbert Metcalf for assistance
with the calculations presented in this paper and for helpful discussions.
This research is part of the NBER Study of the Government Budget and the
Private Economy.
2For a discussion of the effect of promised retirement benefitson the
savings of employees, see Feldstein (1974, 1982a). Barro (1974, 1978) has
discussed an interesting special case in which social security would have no
effect on private saving. His conclusion requires that each individual acts
to maximize a utility function that has as one of its arguments the utility of
his children, and that the initial optimum behavior involves a positive amount
of bequest. Of course, if everyone exhibited such rationality, there would be
rio need or justification for social security retirement benefits. The Barro
conditions imply that social security does not change aggregate savings but
some individuals may save more while others save less. Every individual's
savings will be unchanged only if all individuals in each current and future
generation are alike. [Footnote continued on next page]—2—
savings invested in real capital,3 the individual who substitutes social
security tax Contributions for private savings suffers a welfare loss equal to
the present value of the difference between the social security benefits and
the amount of future income that the displaced savings would have earned.4
The basic problem of designing a social security program is to set the level
of benefits (and the conditions for receiving benefits) in theway that best
balances the desirability of protecting those who would otherwise make
inadequate provisions for their old age against the cost of reduced saving by
those who would otherwise save in a rational way.5
Feldstein (1974) showed that the provision of social security benefits
that are conditional on retirement can increase personal saving if the effect
on saving of the induced increase in retirement outweighs the asset
substitution effect. Sheshinskj and Weiss (1981), Abel (1984) and Hubbard
(1984) examine the implications of uncertain mortality and the absence of
perfect annuity markets f or the effect of social security on saving.
Although there is a wide range of empirical estimates of the effect of
social security on private saving, the bulk of the evidenceappears to this
author to support the conclusion that increases in social security benefits
reduce private saving. Studies supporting this conclusion include Blinder,
Gordon and Wise (1983) and Diamond and Hausman (1984). Those who find little
or no effect of social security on savings include Lesnoy and Learner (1982)
and Munnell (1975).
3Paul Samuelson's (1958) classic article showed that theimplicit rate
of return in an unfunded social securityprogram is the rate of growth of
aggregate wages. Samuelson considered the special case in which real wages
per worker are constant, making the implicit rate of return on social
security equal to the rate of growth of population.
4See Feldstejn (1982b). There is a furthersource of welfare loss to the
rational individual if the social security program distorts laborsupply
either during working years (because the reward to working is reducedby the
social security tax to an extent that is not compensatedby the present value
of future benefits) or at an age when retirement is possible (because
potential benefits are reduced in whole or in part if the individual
continues to work.) See Gustman and Steinmeier (1983) and Danziger et al.
(1981) for recent discussions of these issues. The present analysis
abstracts from these issues by assuming that the quantity of labor supplied
and the age of retirement are both fixed.
5Feldstein(1985a) derives the optimal level of socialsecurity benefits in
a universal social security program for two alternative specifications of—3—
Milton Friedman (1972) and others havesuggested that the common system
of universal eligibility for socialsecurity retirement benefits be replaced
by a means-tested program that pays benefits only to those who lackassets
or private pension income with which to financeadequate post-retirement
consumption. Proponents of this change argue that limiting benefitsonly to
those in financial need would reduce the size of theprogram and therefore
the distortionary effect of the tax that is usedto pay for it.It is also
argued that, since rational savers would receive no benefits, theirsaving
would be influenced only by the presumably modestamount of tax that they pay
to finance the means-tested benefits. Despite thepotential magnitude of the
welfare gain, the proposal for a means-testedprogram has not previously been
the subject of theoretical or empiricalanalysis.
Some social security specialists oppose switching toa means-tested
program because, they argue, there is a stigma attached toaccepting
means—tested benefits which is undesirable in itself and whichdiscourages
eligible individuals from applying for benefits. In addition,eligible
individuals may fail to receive benefits becausethey do not understand that
they are entitled to benefits.6
In assessing these arguments it is of course difficultto know how much
value to place on avoiding the stigmapersethat accompanies means-tested
benefits. it is in principle easier to evaluate the welfarecost of
individuals' failure to apply for means-tested benefitsbecause of such
imperfect foresight. For evidence on the significance ofinadequate
retirement savings, see Diamond (1977) and Kotlikoff et al.(1982).
6See Cohen (1972). For moregeneral discussions of social security
policy and proposals for reform, see Boskin (1977), Feldstein (1975,1977,
1985b), and Munnell (1977).—4—
stigma or because of ignorance of eligibility. Moreover, experience with
other means—tested and conditional programs suggests that the utilization
rate of means-tested retirement benefits by eligible individuals would
increase over time and could be raised by education and advertising. The
potential gains to rational savers of switching the program to a means—tested
basis makes it worthwhile to look beyond the stigma issue and to evaluate
more formally the choice between universal and means-tested programs. That
is the purpose of the present paper.
The analysis shows that there may be a strong case for a means-tested
program but that it is more ambiguous than the casual analysis of Friedman
and others would suggest. Although a means-tested program may be smaller in
total size than a universal program, it does not necessarily produce greater
social welfare even when the implicit return on social security taxes is
substantially lower than the return available on private saving. The analysis
in this paper shows two reasons why an optimal program of universal
unconditional benefits would, under certain conditions, provide a higher level
of social welfare than an optimal program of benefits conditioned by a
means-test.
The principal reason that a universal program may be superior is that a
means-tested program with benefits set at the optimal level may induce some
utility—maximizing workers to save nothing. Although their resulting
consumption in retirement would then be less than they would have chosen
without a social security program, the utility value of the extra consumption
during working years more than offsets the reduced consumption during
retirement. For these individuals, the means-tested program distorts savings—5—
and reduces individual utility by more than a universal program. If that
group is large enough in the population, the universal program may be more
desirable than a means-tested program.
It is also possible for the universal program to be superior even if the
benefits in the alternative means-tested program are set at a level that does
not induce any utility-maximizing workers to stop saving. This can occur
if, in order to avoid inducing the utility—maximizers to stop saving, the
level of the means-tested benefits has to be set substantially lower than
would otherwise be optimal. In this case, switching from a universal program
to a means-tested program reduces the welfare of those who receive the
constrained means-tested benefits by more than it increases the welfare of
the nonrecipients.
In general, the choice between a means-tested program and a universal
program depends on the parameters of the economy (in particular the growth
rates of income and population and the rate of return on real investments)
and on the character and extent of economic shortsightedness among the
working population. The nature of this dependence is examined in the present
paper. The specific results in the very simple models examined here are of
course only suggestive but they do indicate some important qualitative
properties that may be robust and suggest a framework for a more realistic
detailed analysis.
The fact that the optimal choice between a means-tested program and a
universal program depends on the character of the working population has an
important general implication for the design of social security programs. It
implies that, if the working population can be subdivided into groups that-6-•
differ in the relevant parameters, it may be optimal to have a means-tested
program for some groups and a universal program for others. The specific
implications of this are discussed in the final section of the present paper.
1.The Optimal Program in a Two Class Society
It is useful to begin the analysis with the simple case in which workers
are either fully rational life—cycle utility maximizers (or "cyclers" for
short) or completely myopic individuals who always consume their entire net
income ("myopes"). in this case, a means-tested program will produce higher
social welfare than a universal program unless the level of means-tested
benefits must be reduced substantially below the unconstrained optimum in
order to prevent the cyclers from becoming non-savers. Such a constraint may
be binding because allowing the cyclers to become non—savers would imply that
the means-tested program was no longer selective but provided benefits to all
retirees. The present section shows conditions under which such a constraint
causes the universal program to be optimal. It also develops the basic
structure of the analysis that is then extended in the next section to deal
with a more heterogeneous population in which an optimal means-tested program
will induce workers with limited myopia to stop saving.
The analysis is set in an overlapping generations model of the type
developed by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). Individuals live for two
periods, working in the first and being fully retired in the second. At time
t there are Lt workers and Lt_i retirees. The population grows at rate n
per period, implying that Lt =(1+n)Lt...i.Real wages per worker grow at rate
g; thus w. =(1+g)w1.The rate of return on capital is r per period.—7—
It will simplify notation and interpretation in the analysis that follows
if we define x =(1+n)(1+g)/(1+r),the ratio of "one plus the growth rate of
aggregate wages" to "one plus the rate of return on capital." Since the
growth rate of aggregate wages is the implicit rate of return on social
security, x measures the efficiency of social security "saving" relative to
savings invested in real capital.
A fraction iofworkers are myopes who always consume their entire
earnings during their working period. The remaining 1i choose a saving
level during their working years that maximizes lifetime utility, u(Cit,
C2t+i) where C1.isconsumption in period t of workers and C2.1 is
consumption of retirees in period t+1. To be able to derive explicit values
of consumption and utility, I shall assume that the lifetime utility function
is loglinear: u(Cit,C2t+i)
=lnC1. +in
1.1 A Universal Social Security Program
When there is a universal social security program, the government levies
a tax at rate eonwages and uses the proceeds to finance concurrent
benefits of b to each retiree. The budget constraint of a universal social
security program is
(1) t'-t =bLt_1
or
(2) b =(1+n)8w.
Myopesconsume =
(1—e)wduring their working years and C21 =b1
when they are retired. Cyclers choose C1 to maximize lifetime utility
subject to the personal budget constraint C21 =((1—e)w-C1)(1+r) +
Optimal first period consumption is therefore C =o.5[(1-e)wt
+b1/(1+r)]—8—
and the corresponding second period consumption is =
0.5[(1—e)w(1+r)+ b1]. Using the government's budget constraint (equation 2)
to write b1 =(1+n)8w+i
=(1+n)(1+g)ewand recalling that
x =(1+n)(1+g)/(1+r)is the efficiency of social security savings, yields
C 0.5[(1—e) + ex]w and C÷1= 0.5{(1—e) + ex](1+r)w.
Total utility at time t is the sum of the utilities of the Lt workers and
the Lti retirees. With a program of universal social security benefits,
total utility at time t iS:
(3) W =L[giln(1_e)W + (1—ji) ln 0.5(1—8 + 8x)w]
+ Lt 1[t.i in b + (1—li) ln 0.5(1—8 + 8x)(1+r)w1]
After substituting b =(1+n)8wand w1 =w/(l+g).it is possible to
factor out Lti and in w. and write
(4) W =Lt1[(1+n) .t1n (1—8) + (1+n)(1—ji) in 0.5 (1—8 + ex)
+ g.z ln(1+n)8 + (1—gi) in 0.5(1—8 + ex)(1+r)(1+g)]
+ L1(2+n) in
Since the terms including 8 are in the square brackets and do not change from
period to period, the value of e that maximizes W is the same as the value
that maximizes total utility in any other period.7 I shall assume that the
government wishes to choose 8 to maximize this total utility.8
7Except for the initial period when the program is started. In that
period, retirees get windfall benefits that they never paid for. This is
discussed in Feidstein (1985a, pp. 310—314).
8The government might instead choose 8 to maximize the discounted value of
utility in all years including the initial period. Ignoring the initial
period is equivalent to assuming that the discount rate that the government
applies in aggregating utilities is relatively low so that the initial period—9—
The first order condition for the value e* that maximizes totalutility is9
(5) —k1+n)ii—j2+n)(1—ji)(1-x)— e* 1_e* 1-(1_x)e*
-
Thequalitative implications of this condition are easily established by
totally differentiating equation 5. It is easily shown in this way that
d9*/d >0,dO*/dx >0and dO*/dn <0.Before interpreting these it is useful
to derive also the effects of the parameters on the optimal value of theper
u* worker benefits. Since bt =e*(i+n)w,it follows immediately that db /di >0
u* and db /dx >0.The sign of db /dn is ambiguous and depends on the value of
the other parameters.
It is easy to interpret these properties. Since an increase in the
fraction of myopes increases the number of individuals who gain from a higher
level of the universal benefit and decreases the number who lose, it raises
the optimal benefit level (db*/diA >0)and therefore the corresponding tax
rate (d8*/dgi >0).An increase in the relative efficiency of social security
in comparison to real investment, i.e., a rise in the ratio of the implicit
rate of return on social security to the rate of return on real capital,
reduces the cost to the cyclers of the compulsory social securityprogram and
therefore raises the optimal level of both benefits (db(*/dx >0)and taxes
(d8*/dgi >0).Finally, since an increase in the relative number of workers
gets little weight or that the sum does not converge so that it is only
meaningful to maximize the utility of a representative year. Feldstein
(1985a) develops the discounted value and discusses these issues more
explicitly. If the government's utility discount rate is less than
(1+g)(1+n)-1, the discounted sum of utilities does riotconverge and the
government must maximize the representative value of W.
9The second order condition is satisfied for all feasibleparameter
values.-10-
permits a given level of benefits to be achieved with a lower tax rate,
d8*/d(1+n) <0.
Table 1 presents specific numerical values of 0* and of the resulting
level of welfare1° for a range of values of ii and x. To limit the dimension of
the table, the calculations are done for a single value of n based on U.S.
experience. The value of n represents the rate of labor force growth for a
generation, which I will take to be 30 years. Since the U.S. population
grew at an annual rate of 1.4 percent for the three decades beginning
in 1950, I shall take (1+n) =(1.014)30=1.52.
The value of x =(1+g)(1+n)/(1+r)that corresponds to U.S. experience
during these years to x =0.115.This reflects the annual labor force growth
of 1.4 percent, an annual rate of growth of real compensation per hour of
2.2 percent and a pretax real rate of return on U.S. nonfinancial corporate
capital of 11.4 percent.11Together these imply x =[(1.014)(1.022)I(1.114)]30
=0.115.Reducing the population growth rate to zero and the rate of real
compensation growth to 0.32 percent (the average for the most recent decade,
1974—84) cuts the relative efficiency of social security to x =0.043.In
contrast, maintaining the values of g and n but cutting the projected real
rate of return in half (from 0.114 to 0.057) raises the relative efficiency of
social security to x =0.553.The tabulations in Table 1 are presented for
these three values and for selected values of ibetween0.1 and 1.0.
10Except for the factor L
—1and the term (2+n) mw that does not depend
on e. The values in the tabe are actually [W —(2+nln
11The derivation of the 11.4 percent estimate is discussed in Feldstein,
Poterba and Dicks—Mireaux (1983).Table 1
Optimal Tax Rates and Total Utility for Universal
and Means—Tested Programs in a Two—Class Society
Relative
Efficiency of
Relative
Frequency
Optimal TaxRates Total Ut-ilitya
Means-
Saving
Constraint Means-
Social Securityof MyopesUniversalTestedUniversalTested Binding
(x) (ji) O u m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.115 0.10 0.044 0.040 0.384 0.603 no
0.115 0.20 0.088 0.079 0.074 0.375 no
0.115 0.50 0.214 0.198 -0.592 —0.282 no
0.115 0.80 0.328 0.317 —1.046 -0.894 no
0.115 0.90 0.363 0.357 -1.166 -1.087 no
0.043 0.10 0.041 0.040 1.262 1.488 no
0.043 0.20 0.082 0.079. 0.848 1.162 no
0.043 0.50 0.204 0.198 —0.123 0.210 no
0.043 0.80 0.321 0.317 —0.866 —0.698 no
0.043 0.90 0.359 0.357 -1.078 -0.989 no
0.553 0.10 0.082 0.040 -0.968 —0.811 no
0.553 0.20 0.151 0.079 -1.073 -0.881 no
0.553 0.50 0.291 0.184 —1.213 —1.069 yes
0.553 0.80 0.366 0.266 -1.260 —1.225 yes
0.553 0.80 0.366 0.266 -1.260 -1.225 yes
0.553 0.90 0.383 0.289 -1.268*-1.271
aThe number actually reported (W) is not total utility (W) but
W —(2+n)in w)/ Lt_i.—1•1—
The optimal tax rates shown in column 1 increase with the relative
frequency of myopes. With the historic value of x =0.115,the optimal tax
rate increase from =0.044when only 10 percent of the poulation are myopes
to =0.363when 90 percent of the population are myopes. In the limiting
case in which everyone is myopic, e =(2+n)=0.396;this corresponds to
the tax rate that distributes income equally between workers and myopes.
Although a lower efficiency of social security reduces the optimal value of
the effect is not very substantial.
1.2 A Means-Tested Social Security Program
If the social security program is means tested and the level of taxes and
benefits is set in a way that causes cyclers to save, benefits are paid only
to retired myopes and the budget constraint linking the tax rate (8) to the
level of means-tested benefits per beneficiary (bm) is
(6) b =
sinceonly a fractionof retirees receives benefits. The behavior of the
myopes is the same under a means-tested program as under the universal
program. They consume their entire disposable income while working
(C1t =(l—e)w)and depend exclusively on the benefits to finance consumption
during retirement (C2t+1 =bt+i).
If the cyclers save, the level of means-tested benefits is irrelevant and
their behavior is affected only by the tax. They maximize u(C1. C2t+i) =
in +lnL(1_8)w
—Ci](1+r)and therefore choose C =O.S(1-e)wtand
C1 =O.5(1—9)w(1+r).
Cyclers will save if the utility that results from this combination of—12—
C1, is greater than the utility of consuming their entire disposable
income while they are working and relying on the benefits to finance their
consumption. That is, cyciers choose to save if and only if
(7) in O.S(1_e)wt +inO.5(1_e)wt(1+r) >in(1—8)w
+in
bt+j
Since bt =11'(1÷n)ew
and w. =(l+g)wt_1this inequality condition can be
written
(8) in 0.5(1—8) +in0.5(1—8)(1+r) >iri(1—8)+in(1+n)(1+g)e—inji
Afterrearranging terms, this implies that cyclers save if and only if
(9) ln(1) >inx +2in 2 —inji
Thisinequality condition is important because it indicates the maximum
value at which 8 can be set in a means-tested program:
(10) e =
max i.t+4x
This maximum tax rate implies a maximum value for the ratio of the benefits
paid to myopes (and therefore their level of retirement consumption) to the
retirement consumption of cyclers. Since =j2e(1+n)and
O.S(1—e)w1(1+r). the ratio of benefits to the retirement consumption of
cyclers iS:
bt __________________ (11) =
O.5(1_8)w1(1+r)
28x -
(1-e)gi-13—
Substituting 8max from equation 10 yields
bt
(12) =0.5.
2,t max
Thus the maximum level of benefits consistent with continued saving by the
cyclers is one-half of the level of consumption that the cyclers would obtain
by their optimal saving. While this simple result reflects the particular
loglinear utility, it illustrates how the level of benefits may have to be
constrained significantly in a means—tested program in order to keep cyclers
saving.
The value of 8max increases with the relative number of myopes but less
than proportionately, implying that the maximum benefits in a means—tested
program varies inversely with the number of myopes. The value of e also
varies inversely with x, implying that the maximum tax is reduced as the
benefits produced by any level of tax increases. For example, with x =0.115,
rises from =0.30at ji= 0.2to 8max =0.52at ji= 0.5and
8max =0.63at u =0.8.Similarly, with i =0.2,emax rises from emax =0.083
at x =0.553to 8max =0.30at x =0.115and emax =0.538at x =0.043.
If the value 8* that maximizes total utility on the assumption that
cyclers save exceeds emax. the value 8* is irrelevant and the feasible
optimum value for a means-tested program is emax.12
12A means-tested program in which cyclers do not save is, ex post, a
universal program. Such a program is dominated by an ex ante universal
program in which cyclers do some saving.—14—
The analysis now proceeds by deriving, for different parameter
combinations, the optimal tax value (8*) on the assumption that cyclers save.
If 8*8max' the total utility is calculated at 8*; if 8* >8max'total
utility is calculated at 8max These total utility values for a means—tested
program can then be compared to the total utility values for the universal
program to decides whether the means-tested program or the universal program
provides the higher level of total utility.
Total utility at time t under the means-tested program can be written as
the sum of the utilities of the Lt workers and Lt_i retirees as:13
(13) =Lt[iln(1—8)wt +(1—11)ln O.5(1_e)w]
+Lt1[iln b +(1—n)in O.5(1—8)(1+r)w1).
After substituting b =J1(1+n)ewand w1 =w/(1+g)total utility can be
written as
(14) =Lti(M
in 8 +(2+n—i)in (1—8) —(2+n)(1—j.t)ln2
+in(1+n) —pin p -(1—p)in x] +Lt_i(2+n)
in
13mis assumes that cyclers save.-15--
Once again a constant value of e maximizes W1 in each period. The first
order condition for the means—tested program implies
(15)
and, since *= =
(16) m2+n
This result is very striking. It implies that the optimal benefit—wage ratio
depends only on the rate of population growth and is independent of the
frequency of myopes in the population and the relative efficiency of social
security and real investment.
This striking conclusion is easily explained. A means—tested social
security program is equivalent to a redistribution of income from all workers
to those retirees who have no private assets. As such, it is a problem in
optimal income redistribution. With no distorting effect of the tax or the
benefit on labor supply or saving,14 the tax should be used to redistribute
income until the marginal utility of a dollar of additional income for the
working generation equals the marginal utility of a dollar to the retired
myopes. The relative efficiency of private saving and social security at
converting present to future income (x) is irrelevant. And while the relative
number of myopes influences the tax rate required to support the benefits, it
does not alter the optimal level of benefits (* is independent of IA).
14The tax reduces the saving of the cyclers by reducing their disposable
income but there is no substitution effect distortion.-16-
Substituting this value of 8* into equation 14 yields an expression for
the optimal level of total utility in an unconstrained means—testedprogram:
(17) W= L1[(2+n-.) in (2+n—i) —(2+n)in (2+n)
—(2+n)(1—i)in 2 +ln(1+n)—(1—ji)in x +(2+n)in
Of course, if 8* =i/(2+n)> ofequation 10, the feasible maximum
m
value of is lower than and must be calculated by substituting 8max into
equation 14. Since °max =i/(i+4x),this saving constraint 8max <8*wili be
binding unless i/(i+4x) <z/(2+n).Equivalently, the unconstrained
0* =ii/(2+n)must be replaced by 8max =/(4x)whenever i> 2+n-4x.With
n =0.52,the constraint is binding only for high values of u or x. For
example, with x =0.553,the constraint is binding for gi0.31. With
x0.63, the constraint is always binding. While with x <0.38,the
constraint is never binding.
When the constraint -is not binding, total utility for the means tested
program -is always greater than total utility for the universal program.
Although this apparently cannot be shown analytically because the optimal
value of 8 for the universal program -is only defined implicitly by equation 5,
it can be shown by calculating the optimal values of 8u and 8m and the
resulting total utility measure numerically for all conceivable values of t
andx [0 1.0 and 0 <x1.0] and for values of n corresponding to
annual population growth rates between zero and three percent (0 n 1.43).
Even when the constraint on the optimal means-tested tax rate is binding
(8* >8max'the total utility for the means tested program may still be—17—
higher than total utility for the universal program. The universal program
provides a higher level of total utility only when the constraint on the level
of benefits given to the myopes in the means-tested program depresses their
utility below what they would get in an optimal universal program by more than
enough to outweigh the greater adverse effects on the cyclers of a universal
program.
Explicit numerical comparison shows that the universal program is optimal
only for high values of x and relatively high values of j.t.Moreover,the
greater the relative efficiency of social security (i.e., the higher the value
of x), the lower is the relative frequency of myopes in the population at
which the universal program becomes optimal. For example, although the
constraint on e can be binding at x =0.4,it is only binding if p >0.92and,
even then it is never optimal to use a universal program.15 When x =0.6,the
constraint on e is binding for p as low as 0.12 but the universal program is
only optimal at values of p greater than 0.22. Figure 1 shows the
combinations of x and p values at which the universal program is optimal (the
upper triangle) and the wider set of x and p values at which the constraint on
e is binding but the means-tested program remains optimal (including the upper
triangle and t e area between the two lines). The area at the bottom shows
the range of x and p values for which the constraint is not binding and the
means—tested program is optimal.
Note that with the historic measure of social security efficiency
15This calculation assumes the historic rate of population growth of 1.4
percent a year.—18-
(x =0.115),the universal program is never optimal. This conclusion remains
true for all rates of population growth. For the combinations ofjiandx
reported in Table 1, the universal program is optimal only for x =0.553and
=0.9.Recall that x =0.553corresponds to cutting the real rate of return
on capital in half. But even with this extreme assumption, the universal
program is optimal only if myopes constitute nearly all of the population.
This conclusion about the general dominance of the means—testedprogram
depends of course on the simplified characterization of the population as
either pure cyclers or pure myopes. In the richer model of the next section,
there is more scope for a universal program to dominate.
2. The Optimal Program When Benefits Distort Saving
A social security program that pays means-tested benefits to only a
fraction of retirees cannot distort saving in an economy with only twotypes
of individuals. With only two types of individuals, the level of taxes and
benefits can be set in a way that achieves perfect separation betweenmyopes
and cyclers. Nyopes save nothing and depend on benefits while cyclers save
in a way that is influenced by the level of potential benefits. Under these
circumstances, a means-tested program will be optimal unless achieving
separation requires a substantial restraint on the level of benefits.
In an economy with more than two types of individuals, a separation that
does not distort saving is not always a characteristic of an optimal
means-tested program. The analysis in this section shows that the optimal
level of means-tested benefits may cause some individuals who are neither
completely myopic nor perfectly rational life-cycle utility maximizers to stop—19-
saving and rely exclusively on social security benefits. For these
individuals, the reduction in saving is greater than it would be with a
universal program. If they are sufficiently important in the population, the
total utility of a means-tested program may be lower than the total utility
of a universal program. The current analysis examines the characterization
of the economy and of the population that influences this choice.
The analysis of the previous section can be extended to deal with this
more general case by intoducing a third class of individuals who are
partially myopic, that is, who give too little weight to their future utility
when they make savings decisions during their working years. More
specifically, I will assume that a fraction TI of the population acts during
their working years to maximize inC1 +AlnC2with A <1even though their
true lifetime utility is given by inC1 +inC2.In Pigou's ( ) words,
these partial myopes have a "faulty telescopic faculty" that causes them to
give too little weight to future utility.
As before, it is useful to begin by analyzing the effects of a universal
social security program and calculating the total utility level that results
from an optimal universal program. The optimal means-tested program can then
be derived and the resulting total utility level compared with that of the
universal program.
2.1 An Optimal Universal Social Security ProQram
The budget constraint of a universal social security program is the same
in the current three-class economy as it was in the simple economy of the
previous section:—20-
(18) e(1+r).
Thefundamental difference between the previous section and the current
one lies in the behavior of the partial myopes. The partial myopes choose
their first period consumption by maximizing inC1. +Ain C21 subject to
the personal budget constraintC21 =[(l_8)wt_Cit](11r)
+bt+1.This
implies first period consumption of
(19) C =(1+A)'[(1_e)w
+bi/(1+r)]
Using the government budget constraint (18) to eliminate bt and recalling
that x =(li-g)(1+n)/(1+r)measures the efficiency of social security, the
first-period consumption of the partial myopes can be written:
(20) =(1+A)[1—e+ex]w.
Their consumption during retirement can be written:
(21) =
E(1—ew
—C](1+r)
+bt+i
=j-(1+r)w(1_8 +ex)
Although the partial myopes choose their consumption levels by
maximizing in C1. +Ain the proper social valuation of the total
utility of the consumption of the partial myopes living at time t is
liLt in C+ II Lt_j in C where II is the fraction of partial myopes in the
population. The consumption behavior and utility level of the pure myopes
and the pure cyclers is the same as in the previous section. Total utility
at time t with the universal social security program can therefore be written—21—
(22) W =L(g.zin(1_e)wt +IIin (1+A) (1—e +ex)w
+(1—i—fl)in0.5 (1_e+ex)w] +Lt[j.tine(1)wt
+IIin(jI)(1+r)(1_e+ex)w1
+(1—ti-fl)in O.5(1+r)(1_e+8x)w_1]
After substituting w =(1+g)w_1
and Lt =(1+n)Lt_is
it is possible to
factor out Lti and in w and write
(23) W =Lt1E(1+n)& ln(1—8) +(1+n)II in (1+A)1(1—8+Ox)
+(1+ri)(1—ji—ll)in 0.5(1—e+ex) +i inB(1+n)
+IIin (j)(1+n) x1(1—e+ex) +(1—u—fl)in 0.5(l+n) x1 (1—e+ex))
+Lti(2+n)
in
This in turn can be simplified somewhat by collecting like terms to yield:
(24) W =L1[(1+n) giln(1—8)+gi ine
—(1—gi)in x +(2+n)(1—gi)in (l—e+ex)
+in(1+n)—(2+n)(1—gi—rI)in 2
-(2+n)11 ln(1+A) +IIin A] +Lti(2+n)in w.
When there are no partial myopes (fl=O)., equation 24 is equivalent to equation 4
of the previous section.
Consider now the value of e that maximizes totai utility with this
universal program. Since the terms in equation 24 that include e do not
involve either II or A, it follows immediately that the optimal value of e is—22-
independent of the relative number of partial myopes or of their degree of
myopia. It can be verified directly by differentiating W with respect to e
that the optimal tax rate in the universal program satisfies
'25' —(1+n)i (2+n)(1—ji)(1—x) —
0* 1-0*
-
1_(1_x)8*
—
Thisis exactly the same as the optimum condition of equation 5 for an
economy with no partial-myopes.16
The values of 8* corresponding to different values ofand x that are
presented in Table 1 can therefore be used to evaluate the total utility level
given by equation 24. These maximum values for the total utility achievable
with an optimal universal social security program can then be compared with
the corresponding maximum values that can be attained with a means—tested
program. Before presenting the total utility levels implied by equation 24,
it is therefore useful to analyze the means-tested program.
2.2 A Means-Tested Program With Partial Myopes
A universal program of social security benefits reduces the saving of
all individuals who save to finance future consumption, including both pure
life—cyclers and partial myopes.17 In contrast, a means-tested program reduces
saving only if it induces individuals to cut their saving in order to qualify
16This simplifying property is a result of the loglinear nature of the
utility function. It follows directly from equations 20 and 21 that changes
in 8 alter utility in a way that does not depend on the value of A. The
effect of B on utility is therefore the same for partial—myopes and for pure
life—cyclers. Therefore only the relative number of pure myopes is relevant
to determining the optimal value of 0.
17This is in addition to the reduction in saving caused by the reduction
in disposable income that results from the tax. The discussion in the
remainder of the paragraph also ignores this tax effect and focuses on the
substitution of benefits for private wealth accumulation.—23—
for the means—tested benefit. In order to analyze this possibility, I will
assume that benefits are provided only to individuals who do not save at
all.18 Interest then focuses on the possibility that the partial—myopes
choose to stop saving and rely only on the benefits to finance retirement
consumption. Since the level of benefits that induces such substitution may
not be high enough to induce full life cyclers to stop saving, the resultmay
be a means—tested program in which only some retirees receive benefits but in
which a substantial number of people substitute social security benefits for
private saving.
The analysis that follows shows that the means—tested program may be
preferred to a universal program even when partial myopes are induced to
become nonsavers. A means-tested program is preferable to a universal
program under a wide range of parameter values. But the possibility of
inducing partial myopes to become nonsavers does increase the range of
economic parameter values in which a universal program is preferred to a
means-tested program. The implications of this are discussed more fully in
the concluding section of the paper. But first the formal -results must be
derived and analyzed.
In the simpler case in which individuals are either pure myopes orpure
cyclers, I derived the maximum value of B that was consistent with continued
saving by the cyclers. In the current context, two separate sets of
conditions must be derived in order to evalute total utility. In the first
case, the value of B is such that both the cyclers and the partial—myopes
181f the means-tested program provided full benefits topartial-myopes,
there would be no basis for analyzing the substitution of benefits for
private saving. A more complex means—tested program that provided partial
benefits to individuals with private assets but with less than a 100 percent
effective tax rate would be worth analyzing.—24-
continue to save. In the second case, the value of e is such thatonly the
cyclers continue to save and the partial myopes are induced to substitute
benefits for private wealth accumulation. For each set ofparameter values
(jl,x,n, A and 11), both cases must be evaluated separately and the
corresponding values of total utility calculated. The higher utility value
indicates the optimum means-tested program. This total utility valuecan
then be compared with the value of the corresponding universalprogram.
Consider first the conditions under which both cyclers and partial
myopes save. Cyclers choose to save if and only if the utility that results
from saving exceeds the utility of consuming all disposable income and
relying on benefits to finance retirement consumption. This condition is
exactly the same as equation 7 of section 1:
(26) in O.5(]._e)w +ino.5(1_e)w(1+r) >
ln(1_e)w
+inbt+i.
Since in this case benefits are paid only tomyopes, the government's budget
constraint implies bt =1e(1+n)wand cyclers save if
(27) in O.5(1_e)w +inO.5(1—O)wt(1+r) >
ln(1_e)w
+inst 1e(1+n)(1+g)w.
Solving this implies that cyclers will save oniy if e is less than
(28) max I1+4x
just as in the previous section. This maximum value of 8 is denoted 8ax to
emphasize that it is the highest value of 8 consistent with saving by the
cyclers.—25—
The maximum value of 9 that is consistent with continued saving by the
partial myopes can be derived in a similar way. Partial myopes save only if
the resulting lifetime utility (as they perceive it, with weight A given to
second period utility) exceeds the liftime utility that results if all
disposable income is consumed. If the partial myopes do reject the benefits
and save, their consumption is chosen to maximize in C1 +Aln C21
subject to =
((1_e)wt_C1)(1+r).This implies C1 =(1)(1)wt
and therefore that the perceived lifetime utility is ln (1+Ai'(1_9)w +
Aln(1_(1+A))(1_9)w(1+r). The partial myopes therefore save if and only
if
(29) ln(1+A)(1_e)wt +AIn (A/(1+A))(1_e)w(1+r) >in(1-9)w
+Ain bti.
Note again that, with partial myopes saving, benefits are paid only to pure
myopes and therefore bt =M1e(1+n)w.Substituting for bt+i and factoring
out w yields:
(30) in (].+A)1(1—9) +Ain(A/(1+A))(1—8) >ln(1—9)+Ain 6x.
Rearranging terms and solving implies the important condition that
partial myopes save19 if and only if 9 is less than
(31) 9A-_________________
max
—
+x(l+A)U+'A
where the superscript A on indicates that this is the maximum value of max
9 consistent with continued saving by partial myopes.2° Differentiating this
19Th-is is conditional on saving by pure cyclers as well. As I note below,
pure cyciers always save if it is optimal for partial myopes to save.
2O is easy to see (and perhaps reassuring) that with A=1 this is
equivalent to the value of 8max for pure cyclers presented in equation 28.—26-
expression with respect to A shows that 8max rises monotonically with A for
0 <A1. This means that 8 < implies8 <; ifthe value of 9 is max max
low enough to keep partial—myopes saving, it is also lowenough to keep
cyclers saving.
Before looking at the second case in which partial-myopes do notsave,
it is interesting to see the way in which thepresence of partial myopes
reduces the maximum value of 8 (and the corresponding value of benefits) that
is consistent with leaving saving unchanged.21 For example, with the value of
x =0.115corresponding to U.S. experience of the past three decades, the
maximum tax rate consistent with unchanged saving drops from 8c=0.30 max
when ji= 0.2to eA=0.11when partial myopes have A =0.5 and to only
9max =0.06when partial myopes have A =0.2.The relative reductions are
only slightly smaller when the fraction of myopes is larger. For example,
when half of the population are myopes (gi= 0.5),8ax =0.52but declines
to =0.39when partial myopes have A =0.5and 8A =0.23when A =0.2. max max
Thus the maximum value of 9 consistent with unchanged saving drops
substantially whenthereare partial myopes whose initial level of saving is
relatively low.
I turn therefore to the second case in which the level of 8 is high
enough to cause partial-myopes not to save but not so high that cyclers cease
saving. The values of e that define this range are not the values of eax
and that have just been derived because they were derived using the max
government constraint that holds when only the pure myopes are nonsavers.
2LJnchanged saving refers to no substitution of benefits for private
saving. The tax per se will always alter saving.—27-
Since the current case corresponds to providing benefits to partial myopes as
well as pure myopes, the government budget constraint becomes bt =
e(1+n)w.
It then follows directly that the values of e that define the
current range can be obtained by substituting t+fl for jiinthe previously
derived expressions for and max max
More specifically, the cyclers will continue to save if and only if
(32) 8
it
Similarly,the partial myopes will not save only if
(33) 8 > X(i+fl)
(1+X)/A A(t+rI) +x(1+A)
Since the right hand side of 33 is an increasing function of A for 0 <A 1,
it follows that there exists a range of values of e that satisfies both
inequalities:
(34)
i+fl (ji+11)A
ji+fl+4x (+fl)A +x(1+A)(1)A
Expression 34 is the condition for the cyclers to save while the partial
myopes do not.
The total utility equation depends on whether the maximum value of e
corresponds to the first or second case. Consider first the total utility
equation if only the pure myopes do not save. Total utility is then given by—28—
(35) = L[ in(i_e)w + Hin(1+X)1(l_e)w
+ (1-il—IT)inO.S(l—O)wt) + Lt[l1inbt
+H1n(j-)(1_e)w1(1+r +(1—Il--fl)in o.5(1_B)w_1(1+r)]
Using =(1'-g)w1, Lt = andx =(1+g)(1+n)/(1+r),equation 35
can be rewritten as:
(36) =L 1{(1+n) ji ln(1—e)+(1+n)flln(1+A)1(1—8)
+(1+n)(1-p--r[)in 0.5(1—8) +pin 8(1+n)
+ITin(j-)(1-O)(1+n)x1 +(1-ti-fl)in 0.5(1-8)(1+n)x1]
+L1(2+n)
The first order condition for the optimal value of & in the means—tested
program (conditionai on that vaiue also being consistent with saving by both
cyclers and partial myopes) is22
(37) 2+n
Note that this isexactlythe same vaiue of the optimal tax rate for the means
tested program that was obtained for the simpler structure in which there were
no partial myopes. This is not surprising since, in the current case, the
partial myopes continue to save and are therefore unaffected by the level of
22The analysis that follows shows that the cyclers save if the partial
myopes save.-29-
benef its.
This optimal 8* will be consistent with the result that e* <8axof
equation 31 if and only if
(38) —--<
2+n
At +x(l+A)'X
or
(39) xX1(1+X)"' <2+n—i
For example, with the historic values of x =0.115and 1+n =1.52,this
inequality will be satisfied for all values of A0.23 regardless of the
relative frequency of the pure myopes (gi).Thusunless partial myopes give
very little weight to future utility, the unconstrained optimal tax rate for
the means-tested program is consistent with continued saving by partial
myopes. At very low values of A, the opposite is true; with A <0.13,the
inequality cannot be satisfied for any value of ji< 1.Thus if partial myopes
put little enough weight on future utility, it may not be possible to have
partial myopes saving at the optimum value of 9*
Consider now the optimum value of 8 in the second case in which only the
cyclers save. In this case, the total utility is given by
(40) =L((+fl)ln(1_8)w +(1—gi—il)in O.S(1—e)w]
+Lt_i
[(gi+ll) inbt
+(1—gi—fl)in0.5(1—O)w..1(1-Fr)]
or, since in this case b = (gi+r1)
8(1.4-n)w.
(41) =L1[(1+n)(gi+ll) ln(1—8) +(1+n)(1—-fl)In0.5(1-0)
+(gi+11)ln(gi+r!) 8(1+n) +(1—gi—fl)in 0.5(I-0)(1+n)x1]
+L1(2+n)
ln—30-
The first order condition for the optimum tax rate in the means-testedprogram
when partial myopes behave like pure myopes is
(42) 2+n
This is exactly analogous to the previously derivedoptimum tax rates for
programs except that p+IT now replaces gibecausepartial myopes behave like
pure myopes.
This optimal value of 9* will be consistent with the limits ofequation
34 on 8 that are required for cyclers to save while partialmyopes do not save
if:
(43)
ji+fl> (p+fl)A
JI+fl+4x2+n
(u+rl)A +
or
(44) iI +fl+xA1(1+A)1 ),'X >2+n>p + Ii+4x
The second of these inequalities is satisfied for the historic values ofn =
0.52and x =0.115for all possible values of p+TI.The first inequality is
satisfied for low values of A but not for high values. Moreprecisely, with
the historic values, the first inequality is satisfied for A <0.13but is
never satisfied for A0.23. Thus the double inequality that defines this case
in which partial myopes do not save at the optimal 9* is satisfiedonly f or a
rather narrow range of very low values of A if x and n take their historic
values. But with a higher value of x, the range of A values consistent with
nonsaving by the partial myopes is much broader. For example, with x =0.553
(and n Continuing at 0.52), the first of the inequalities is satisfied for—31—
values ranging to more than A =0.8.The double inequality is satisfied by
values between A =0and A =0.6for very low values of i+fl but is satisfied
for 0 <A 0.5 even at ji+fl=0.5.
Finally, it is possible that the value of 8 derived on the assumption
that only cyclers save will in fact cause even cyclers to want to stop saving.
Since this limit on 8 is given by equation 32 and the optimal value of 8 is
given by 42, we see that the constraint on 8 will be binding only if
(45) >
2+n i+fl+4x
or
(46) j.t+fl+4x2+n
Although this can never be binding for the historic values of x =0.115and
n =0.52,the constraint could be binding if social security were more
efficient. When x =0.5,the constraint is binding if gi+fl >n.So even low
values of iandfl could then make it necessary to constrain 8 =(z+fl)/(J2+fl+4x)
instead of allowing it to take its unconstrained maximum value.
To summarize, there are three possible values of 8* and the corresponding
total utility values that must be examined in assessing the means—tested
program. In the first case, only myopes do not save, 8* =M/(2+n)and the
total utility is obtained by substituting this value into equation 36. In the
second case, both the myopes and the partial myopes do not save, e* =
(ii-fl)/(2+n)and total utility is obtained by substituting the value into
equation 41. Finally, if both myopes and partial myopes do not save and 8
must be set equal to the maximum value consistent with saving by the cyclers-32-
9 =(ji+fl)(i+fl+4x),the total utility is obtained by substituting this value
'into equation 41.
Table 2 compares the universal and means-tested programs for a widerange
of the parameter values. The top half of the table corresponds to the
historic experience (x0.115 and n =0.52)while the bottom half corresponds
to a relatively much more efficient social security program (x =0.553and
n =0.52).Calculations are presented for values of iandII ranging from 0.1
to 0.5 and for A =0.1,A =0.2and A =0.5.
For each set of parameter values, the table shows six things. Columns 1
* and2 show the optimal tax rate for a universal program9u and the resulting
level of total welfare23 (W). The same two statistics are presented for
means tested programs in columns 3 and 4. An asterisk next to the higher
utility value indicates the type of program that is optimal. Column 5
indicates for the means-tested programs whether the partialmyopes save. The
final column indicates whether the tax rate in the means-testedprogram had to
be limited to assure that the cyclers continue to save.
Over a wide range of parameter values, a means-tested program is
preferable to any universal program. With the historical values of social
security efficiency (x =0.115)and population growth (ii =0.52),the
universal program is optimal only for low values of A and t.Evenwhen
partial myopes give even as little weight to future utility as A =0.2,the
means-tested program is always optimal. But when the partial myopes weight
future utility at only A =0.1,their implied saving rate is so low that an
23Again, this is after rescaling byLt1 and ignoring the term (2+n)lnw
that enters all measures equally.Table 2
Optima] Universal and Means-Tested Programs
when Benefits Distort Saving
Frequency of
Utility
Weight
by
UniveralProgramsMeans-Tested Programs
Saving
Con-
Optimal
Tax
WelfareaOptimal
Tax
WelfareaDo
Partial Partial
MyopesMyopesMyopes* * Myopesstrain
(t) (11) (X) (W1) °m (Wm) Save?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Historic Relative Efficiency ofSocial Security (x =0.115)
0.1 0.]. 0.1 0.044 0.304 0.079 0.375* no no
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.044 0.225* 0.119 0.151 no no
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.044 0.238 —0.492 no no
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.088-0.006 0.119 0.151* no no
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.088—0.085 0.159 —0.068* no no
0.2 0.5 0.1 0.088 0.278 -0.696 no no
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.214—0.781 0.238 no no
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.214—0.751 0.278 no no
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.044 0.352 0.040 0.571* yes no
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.044 0.319 0.040 0.538* yes no
0.1 0.5 0.2 0.044 0.223 0.040 0.442* yes no
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.088 0.042 0.079 0.343* yes no
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.088 0.010 0.079 0.310* yes no
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.088-0.087 0.079 0.214* yes no
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.214—0.624 0.198 yes no
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.214—0.656 0.198 yes no
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.044 0.387 0.040 0.606* yes no
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.044 0.890 0.040 0.609* yes no
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.044 0.400 0.040 0.619* yes no
0.2 0.1 0.5 0.088 0.077 0.079 0.378* yes no
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.088 0.080 0.079 0.381* yes no
02 0.5 0.5 0.088 0.090 0.079 0.391* yes no
0.5 0.1 0.5 0.214—0.589 0.198 -0.279* yes no
0.5 0.2 0.5 0.214—0.585 0.198 yes no
0.1 0.1
Higher Relative Earnings ofSocial Security (x =0.553)
0.1 0.082—1.048 0.079 ..0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.082 —1.127 0.119 no no
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.082—1.366 0.213 no yes
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.151 -1.153 0.119 no no
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.151—1.233 0.153 no yes
0.2 0.5 0.1 0.151—1.472 0.240 no yes
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.291—1.292 0.213 no yes
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.291 -1.372 0.240 no yesTable 2 Continued
W —(2+n)ln P4)!Lt_j.
Frequency of
Utility
Weight
by
UniveralPrograms
Optimal
Tax
Welfarea
Partial
MyopesMyopesMyopes*
(ii) (II) (A) (ed) (We)
Means-Tested Programs
Optimal Welfarea Do
(4)
Tax
*
(emo)
(6) (5) (7)
Partial
Myopes
Save?
(8)
Saving
Con -
straint
(e<e*)
(9) (1) (2) (3)
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.082—1.000 0.079 —0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.082—1.032 0.119 —0.948* no no
0.1 0.5 0.2 0.082—1.129 0.213 -1.124* no yes
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.151—1.106 0.119 —0.948* no no
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.151—1.138 0.153 —1.010* no yes
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.151—1.235 0.240 -1.176* no yes
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.291—1.245 0.213 no yes
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.291—1.277 0.240 no yes
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.082—0.965 0.079 —0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.082—0.962 0.119 -0.948* no no
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.082—0.952* 0.213 -1.124 no yes
0.2 0.1 0.5 0.151—1.070 0.119 -0.948* no no
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.151—1.067 0.153 -1.010* no yes
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.151—1.058* 0.240 -1.176 no yes
0.5 0.1 0.5 0.291—1.209 0.213 1.124* no yes
0.5 0.2 0.5 0.291—1.206 0.240 -1.176* no yes
aThe number actually reported (W) is not total utility (W) but—33—
optimal means tested program would cause partial myopes to stop saving. This
is not a sufficient condition to make a universal program optimal but, if the
partial myopes are frequent enough in the population, it does become important
enough to outweigh the adverse effects of a universal program on the pure
cyclers. Thus the universal program dominates when gi =0.1and II =0.2,or gi
= 0.1and II =0.5and similarly when g.t= 0.2and II =0.5.
Two things should be noted about these three combinations. First, it
follows from the structure of the problem that if the universal program is
optimal for gi= o.i,fl =0.2and for ji= 0.1and fl =0.5,then the universal
program is also optimal for all values of U0.2 if gi= 0.1.Note also that
since the means tested program is preferable at gi= 0.1and II =0.1,there is
some value of II between 0.1 and 0.2 at which the universal program becomes
optimal. Thus, for low enough A and ji,theuniversal program is optimal as
long as at least a modest fraction of the population are partial myopes.
Second, at ji= 0.2the universal program is not optimal at II =0.2but
becomes optimal at some value of 0.2 <U<0.5.When there are more myopes,
the optimal means-tested program becomes relatively more expensive and thus
keeps the universal program optimal until the distortion of saving by the
partial myopes becomes a more important problem, i.e., until U reaches a
higher level. For the same reason, when gi= 0.5the mean-tested program is
optimal at fl =0.2and remains optimal until U 0.
When myopes put a higher value on future utility (A =0.2and A =0.5),
the partial myopes continue to save with the uncontrained optimal means-tested
program. Under these conditions, the means-tested program dominatesthe
universal program.-34-
When social security is more efficient relative to privatesaving, two
things hapen. First, under an optimal means-tested program, the partial
myopes will in general choose to stop saving and depend on the social security
benefits. Note that, with x =0.553,the partial myopes do not save at any of
the parameter combinations. Second, although the means—testedprogram causes
partial myopes to stop saving, the result is a smaller welfare loss when
social security is relatively efficient. As a result, the means-tested
program remains preferable at moderate values of A.
As A rises, the reduction in the saving of partial myopes caused by a
means—tested program becomes large. In addition, with a high value of A =0.5
and with ri =05,it is necessary to constrain the means-tested tax rate to
avoid causing the cyclers to stop saving as well. In thesecases, where
<8*for the means-tested program, the universal program is optimal.
The optimal tax rates in columns 1 and 3 show that an optimal
means—tested program is not in general smaller than an optimal universal
** program.Since the tax base is the same for both types of programs,8m >
impliesthat total taxes and therefore total benefits are higher under the
means—tested program. With the historic value of x =0.115,the optimal
means—tested program is larger than the corresponding universal program with
low values of A (because it is then optimal to induce the partialmyopes to
stop saving) but is smaller than the universal program when A is not very low.
With a higher value of x =0.553,the relative size of the universal and
means—tested programs depends on the values of fl and giandno simple
generalization is possible. It cannot be said that a means-tested program is
better because it is smaller, although table 2 indicates that, whenever the—35—
universal program is preferable, it is also smaller than the corresponding
optimal means-tested program.
3.A Concluding Comment
The analysis of this paper shows that a means-tested social security
program may be preferable to a universal program under a wide range of
economic conditions. But the analysis also shows that the optimal type of
program and the optimal level of benefits in a universal program depend on the
.___ A — .L_ .__.1.'__ _..A .L r pdruIeers ut uescrioe ne popu iaiun ariu rie ecurluruy.ror riy UfflUifId1Ui1
offl and A, an increase in the relative frequency of myopes raises the optimal
tax in the means-tested program. Similarly, if the means—tested program is
optimal but causes partial myopes to stop saving, the optimal tax rate
increases with the combined frequency of myopes and partial myopes.
This suggests that overall welfare can be increased if the working
population as a whole can be divided into two subgroups with a different type
of program provided to each group. Note that this does not require that the
subgroups be homogeneous --allcyclers or all myopes --butonly that the
groups have different mixes of myopes, partial myopes and cyclers. Moreover,
although it would obviously be best to know the characteristics of each
subgroup with precision, a welfare improvement could be achieved even with
imperfect information.
An obvious criteria for grouping individuals is income. Low income
individuals are more likely to be myopes or to be partial myopes who give low
weight to future consumption. If so, the low income group might be an
appropriate candidate for a universal program.
All of the analysis in this paper has reflected the fact that the utility-36-
characteristics that influence the saving behavior of each individual are
unobservable. it is possible, however, to observe saving. An individual who
saves, especially in the form of a pension or special retirement account, is
certainly not a myope in the sense of this paper. The analysis presented here
implies that any individual who demonstrates sufficient saving should be
eligible for a means—tested program even if a universal program would be
optimal for that individual's population subgroup.
Finally, it should be noted that, within the population for whom a
means—tested program is optimal, there is no way to increase efficiency by
varying the program among subgroups (unless the means-tested benefits would
cause cyclers to become nonsavers). To see this, note that the optimal level
of means-tested benefits does not depend on the values of A, j.t,or11; the
optimal tax rate varies only because differences in .&(andin II if partial
myopes stop saving) changes the tax rate required to finance a given level of
benefits. To see this, recall that 9* =gi/(2+n)for the means-tested program
if partial myopes save (equation 37) and 9* =(gi+fl)/(2+n)if only cyclers save
(equation 42). But benefits per retiree are bt =(M+n) 1(1+n)ewif only
cyclers save. The benefit to wage ratio is therefore always
bt/wt =(1+n)/(2+n).Creating separate subgroups would not cause the optimal
benefit/wage ratio to vary among subgroups. Since redistributing the tax
burden would not provide any overall welfare change, there is no gain from
disaggregation within the means—tested population.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Ortober 1985-.37-.
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Optimal Tax Rates and Total Utility for Universal
and Means-Tested ProQrams in a Two-Class Society
Relative
Efficiency of
Relative
Frequency
Optimal TaxRates Total Utility* Saving
Constraint Means- Means-
Social Securityof MyopesUniversalTestedUniversalTested Binding
(x) (p) e e m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.115 0.10 0.044 0.040 0.384 0.603 no
0.115 0.20 0.088 0.079 0.074 0.375 no
0.115 0.50 0.214 0.198 —0.592 -0.282 no
0.115 080 0.328 0.317 -1.046 -0.894 no
0.115 0.90 0.363 0.357 -1.166 —1.087 no
0.043 0.10 0.041 0.040 1.262 1.488 no
0.043 0.20 0.082 0.079 0.848 1.162 no
0.043 0.50 0.204 0.198 -0.123 0.210 no
0.043 0.80 0.321 0.317 -0.866 -0.698 no
0.043 0.90 0.359 0.357 -1.078 -0.989 no
0.553 0.10 0.082 0.040 —0.968 -0.811 no
0.553 0.20 0.151 0.079 -1.073 -0.881 no
0.553 0.50 0.291 0.184 -1.213 -1.069 yes
0.553 O.80 0.366 0.266 -1.260 -1.225 yes
0.553 0.80 0.366 0.266 -1.260 —1.225 yes
0.553 0.90 0.383 0.289 —1.271
*The number actually reported (W) is not total utility (W) but
W —(2+n)ln w)/ Lti.Table 2
Optimal Universal and Means-Tested Programs
when Benefits Distort Saving
Frequency of
Utility
Weight
by
Univeral
Optimal
Tax
Programs
Welfare1
Means-Tested Pro9rams
Optimal Welfare1 Do
Tax Partial
Saving
Con— Partial
MyopesMyopesMyopes* * Myopesstrain
(ii) (11) (A) (ed) (We) (em)'m Save? (e<e*)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Historic Relative Efficiency of Social Security (x =0.115)
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.044 0.304 0.079 0.375* no no
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.044 0.225* 0.119 0.151 no no
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.044—0.014* 0.238 -0.492 no no
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.088—0.006 0.119 0.151* no no
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.088-0.085 0.159 -0.068* no no
0.2 0.5 0.1 0.088—0.324* 0.278 —0.696 no no
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.214-0.781 0.238 -0.492* no no
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.214—0.751 0.278 —0.696* no no
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.044 0.352 0.040 0.571* yes no
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.044 0.319 0.040 0.538* yes no
0.1 0.5 0.2 0.044 0.223 0.040 0.442* yes no
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.088 0.042 0.079 0.343* yes no
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.088 0.010 0.079 0.310* yes no
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.088-0.087 0.079 0.214* yes no
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.214—0.624 0.198 —0.314* yes no
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.214—0.656 0.198 —0.347* yes no
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.044 0.387 0.040 0.606* yes no
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.044 0.890 0.040 0.609* yes no
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.044 0.400 0.040 0.619* yes no
0.2 0.1 0.5 0.088 0.077 0.079 0.378* yes no
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.088 0.080 0.079 0.381* yes no
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.088 0.090 0.079 0.391* yes no
0.5 0.1 0.5 0.214-0.589 0.198 -0.279* yes no
0.5 0.2 0.5 0.214—0.585 0.198 —0.276* yes no
Higher Relative Earnings ofSocial Security (x =0.553)
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.082-1.048 0.079 -0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.082-1.127 0.119 -0.948* no
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.082—1.366 0.213 —1.124* no yes
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.151-1.153 0.119 -0.948* no no
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.151 —1.233 0.153 -1.010* no yes
0.2 0.5 0.1 0.151 —1.472 0.240 -1.176* no yes
0.5 0.1 0.1 0.291 -1.292 0.213 —1.124* no yes
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.291—1.372 0.240 no yesative
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Utility Univeral Programs
Frequency of
Partial
Myopes Myopes
(ji) (II)
(1) (2)
Weight
by
Myopes
(A)
(3)
Means-Tested Pro9rams
Optimal Welfare1 Do Optimal Welfare1
Tax
*
8U (We)
(4) (5)
Tax
*
8mO
(6) (7)
Partial
Myopes
Save?
(8)
Saving
Con -
straint
(ec<e*)
(9)
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.082-1.000 0.079 -0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.082-1.032 0.119 —0.948* no no
0.1 0.5 0.2 0.082—1.129 0.213 no yes
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.151—1.106 0.119 —0.948* no no
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.151-1.138 0.153 no yes
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.151—1.235 0.240 no yes
0.5 0.1 0.2 0.291—1.245 0.213 —1.124* no yes
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.291—1.277 0.240 no yes
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.082—0.965 0.079 —0.881* no no
0.1 0.2 0.5 0.082—0.962 0.119 -0.948* no no
0.1 0.5 0.5 0.082—0.952* 0.213 —1.124 no yes
0.2 0.1 0.5 0.151—1.070 0.119 —0.948* no no
0.2 0.2 0.5 0.151—1.067 0.153 no yes
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.151 0.240 —1.176 no yes
0.5 0.1 0.5 0.291—1.209 0.213 no yes
0.5 0.2 0.5 0.291-1.206 0.240 no yes